The Court of First Instance refused to read it for the reasons already indicated under the Sixth Assignment. (Supra).
EIGHTH ASSIGNMENT
The Supreme Court erred in sustaining the ruling of the District Court of San Juan, which held that the case was one of serious assault.
The local statute that establishes the crime of assault and battery is an exact copy of the same statute of the state of Texas.
Since we had no precedents in Puerto Rico, we have had to resort to those Texas statutes.
In 666, the Court expressed:
“In order for an assault against a person who is an officer to constitute serious assault, as provided in the Penal Code of 1895, Article 601, the assault must have been committed against an officer who is fulfilling the legal duties of his office, etc… It must appear that the person assaulted was an officer in the actual performance of his duties and that said assault was carried out as an interruption of his duties.”
From the evidence it clearly appears that the defendant did not go to visit Mr. Toro for any matter that affected the official duties of the latter.
Mr. del Toro himself testified that he was resting, that he had just finished lunch as usual, that he had walked after lunch; that he could be seen in his office for other matters not related to his official duties.
(Rec. p. 6-12).
The Prosecutor was unable to show a single official function in which Mr. del Toro was engaged at the time of the alleged assault.
NINTH ASSIGNMENT
The Supreme Court erred in sustaining the ruling of the District Court of San Juan that the Prosecutor had proven beyond a reasonable doubt a case of assault and battery.
We are convinced that this Court will find, upon reading the printed evidence and the law related to the matter, that there is no case of assault and battery.
TENTH ASSIGNMENT
The Supreme Court erred in sustaining the ruling of the District Court of San Juan affirming that the penalty was not unusual or unduly severe.
The defendant was deprived of a jury trial in the Court in said case.
However, the accusation was brought in the name of the People of Puerto Rico because, deprived of a jury trial under the local statutes, a guilty verdict was a sure thing. Then, relegated to that distant and distant Court, the defendant would have had to suffer the penalty, just as the Prosecutor expected.
It is certain that a jury would have found the defendant guilty.
A sentence of one year plus costs, imposed by judges who are supposed to be more free from prejudices and fears than juries, seems repulsive.
The judges owe their positions to political appointments and are at the mercy of the will of the Governor of Puerto Rico, representative in Puerto Rico of the power of the United States. Without a doubt, they did not feel free to act in this case.
The decision of the lower Courts must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
PEDRO ALBIZU CAMPOS Attorney for the Accused-Appellant
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 11, 1911.